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We argue that noisy aggregation of dispersed information provides a unified explanation
for several prominent cross-sectional return anomalies such as returns to skewness, returns to
disagreement and corporate credit spreads. We characterize asset returns with noisy information
aggregation by means of a risk-neutral probability measure that features excess weight on tail
risks, and link the latter to observable moments of earnings forecasts, in particular forecast
dispersion and accuracy. We calibrate our model to match these moments and show that it
accounts for a large fraction of the empirical return premia. We further develop asset pricing
tools for noisy information aggregation models that do not impose strong parametric restrictions
on economic primitives such as preferences, information, or return distributions.
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1 Introduction
Dispersed information and disagreement among investors about the expected cash-flows of different
securities is a common feature of many, if not most financial markets, and markets are often
viewed as playing a central role of aggregating such information through prices. We develop a
parsimonious, flexible theory of asset pricing in which aggregation of dispersed information emerges
as the core force determining asset prices and expected returns. Our theory links the asset’s
predicted prices and returns to the distribution of the underlying cash-flow risk and features of
the market environment such as market liquidity and investor disagreement. It provides a unified
explanation for several widely discussed empirical regularities. We show that our theory is consistent
with negative excess return to skewness, with seemingly contradictory empirical evidence on the
impact of investor disagreement on returns in equity and bond markets, and that it can account
for a significant part of the high level and variation in corporate credit spreads - the credit spread
puzzle.
We consider an asset market along the lines of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980),
and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981).1 An investor pool consists of informed investors who observe
a noisy private signal about the value of an underlying cash flow, and uninformed noise traders
whose random trades determine the net supply of the asset. The asset price equates the demand
by informed investors to the available asset supply and serves as an endogenous, noisy public signal
of the asset’s cash-flow. In contrast to the existing literature we do not impose any parametric
restrictions on the distribution of asset dividends, which allows us to derive return implications for
a wide range of assets traded in financial markets, and to confront the model-implied returns with
their empirical counterparts.
The textbook no-arbitrage paradigm interprets systematic return differences across securities as
compensation for risk. We build on no-arbitrage theory by constructing a risk-neutral probability
measure for asset prices with dispersed information, and we identify information frictions and limits
to arbitrage as a novel source of systematic return differences. In contrast to its no-arbitrage coun-
terpart, the risk-neutral probability measure with noisy information aggregation is asset-specific
since it factors in information and noise-trading frictions that may be specific to each individual
security. Nevertheless, the equilibrium imposes restrictions on the shape of the risk-neutral prob-
ability measure. Specifically, noisy information aggregation generates excess weight on tail risks:
the risk-neutral measure overweighs the probabilities of both very favorable and very unfavorable
1See Brunnermeier (2001), Vives (2008), and Veldkamp (2011) for textbook discussions.
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outcomes. This contrasts with a risk adjustment that overweighs unfavorable outcomes relative to
favorable ones. What’s more, the extent by which the market overweighs tail risks scales with the
dispersion of investor expectations about returns. Negative returns to skewness, negative (positive)
returns to investor disagreement for positively (negatively) skewed securities, and positive interac-
tion between skewness and investor disagreement are then a natural consequence of interpreting
the expected price premium as the value of a mean-preserving spread.
We introduce our model in section 2 and develop the main theoretical results in section 3. The
main technical challenge comes from dealing with the endogeneity of information contained in the
asset price. By assuming that investors are risk-neutral but face position limits, we are able to
fully characterize the information content of the price without any further restrictions on return
distributions. Moreover by assuming risk-neutrality, our model abstracts from “standard” risk
premia to focus on the role of noisy information aggregation for asset returns.
The theoretical contribution proceeds in three steps.
First, we represent the equilibrium price by means of a sufficient statistic variable that sum-
marizes the information aggregated through the market. This sufficient statistics representation
reveals the presence of an updating wedge: noisy information aggregation makes the asset price
more sensitive to fundamental and liquidity shocks than the corresponding risk-adjusted dividend
expectations. Hence the prices is higher (lower) than expected dividends whenever the information
aggregated through the price is sufficiently (un-)favorable.
Second, we use this equilibrium characterization to represent the expected return of the asset
by means of a risk-neutral probability measure. Applying the Law of Total Variance, we show
that the updating wedge naturally leads to excess weight on tail risks: the difference between the
risk-neutral and the objective prior distribution of fundamentals decomposes into a shift in means
that accounts for average supply effects akin to risk premia in a model with risk averse investors,
and a mean-preserving spread that captures the additional effects of dispersed information and
limits to arbitrage: securities characterized by upside (downside) risk are priced above (below)
their fundamental value. Moreover, the over-pricing of upside or under-pricing of downside risks
scales with excess weight on tail risks.
Third, we relate excess weight on tail risks to two observable moments of return forecasts,
forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy. In the model, almost all the variation in excess weight
on tail risks is linked to forecast dispersion, which in turn allows us to interpret forecast dispersion
as a natural proxy for excess weight on tail risks. This allows us to discipline excess weight on
tail risks with earnings forecast data, test the main predictions of our model, and offer a novel
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interpretation of existing empirical results.
In section 4, we thus show that our theory is consistent with several, seemingly unrelated, asset
pricing puzzles:
1. Returns to skewness: Consistent with the first core prediction of our model, a large empirical
literature documents a negative relation between skewness of the return distribution and expected
returns in equity markets.2
2. Credit spread puzzle: Corporate credit spreads are very large relative to the underlying default
risks, and difficult to reconcile with compensation for default risk, especially for high investment
grade bonds.3 In our model, credit spreads overweigh default risk, and the resulting ratio of spreads
to expected default losses can become arbitrarily large for highly rated bonds.
3. Returns to disagreement: The empirical evidence on returns to investor disagreement is
divided. Several studies find negative returns to disagreement in equity markets, which are typically
interpreted in support of heterogeneous priors models with short-sales constraints in which securities
are over-priced due to an implicit re-sale option whose value is always increasing with forecast
dispersion (Miller, 1977). Others find positive returns to disagreement in bonds markets, and
interpret disagreement as a proxy for risk.4 Our model explains why higher disagreement can lead
to lower equity returns but higher bond returns, consistent with empirical evidence. It offers a
unified explanation for these seemingly contradictory empirical results by identifying upside vs.
downside risk as the key determinant for signing the returns to disagreement.
4. Interaction effects: several studies suggest that returns to disagreement interact with proxies
for return asymmetry, such as the value premium for equity, or measures of leverage and default
risk for bonds.5 Our theory provides a unified explanation for such interaction effects.
We then calibrate the informational parameters of our model to match dispersion of analysts’
earnings forecasts and argue that even moderate degrees of information frictions can account for a
quantitatively significant and empirically plausible fraction of the observed returns.
2See Conrad, Dittmar and Ghysels (2013), Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010) and Green and Hwang (2012).
3See Huang and Huang (2012), Feldhütter and Schaefer (2018) and Bai, Goldstein and Yang (2020) for recent
contributions.
4See Diether, Malloy, and Sherbina (2002), and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), and Yu (2011) for
returns to disagreement in equity markets, Guntay and Hackbarth (2010) for bond markets and Carlin, Longstaff
and Matoba (2014) for mortgage-backed securities.
5Yu (2011) reports that the value premium increases by 6.9% p.a. between the lowest and highest disagreement
terciles, and that the returns to disagreement decrease by 7% p.a. from the highest to the lowest book-to-market
ratio equity quintiles. Guntay and Hackbarth (2010) report that disagreement has far larger impact on bond spreads
and bond returns for firms with high leverage or low credit ratings.
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We use I.B.E.S. data on analysts’ earning forecasts to measure analyst forecast dispersion and
accuracy and impute excess weight on tail risks at the firm level for a cross-section of equity returns.
These measures suggest that information frictions and excess weight on tail risks are highly skewed:
for most firms, excess weight on tail risks appears to be negligible, but for firms in the top quintile,
our measure of excess weight on tail risks can be very significant. For the median firm, excess
weight on tail risks corresponds to less than 2% fo the standard deviation of earnings, but the
sample average is respectively at 2.7% and 8.4% in two different forecast samples that we study,
and 2-3 times as large in the top quintile of the distribution.
We calibrate the precision of private signals and the variance of supply shocks in the model
to match the range of excess weight on tail risks suggested by the I.B.E.S. data, and parametrize
the asset return distribution to match idiosyncratic skewness and volatility reported for different
portfolios in Conrad, Dittmar and Ghysels (2013) and Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010). Our
model generates returns to skewness ranging from 34% to 100% of the empirical returns to skewness
for empirically plausible levels of information frictions across the two studies. In addition, we
account for about 60% of the returns to disagreement in equity markets and a similar fraction of
the observed interaction effects.
We also calibrate our model to match observed default risks on corporate bonds and show that
plausible levels of information frictions account for up to 35% of the levels and variations in credit
spreads for high quality corporate bonds. This is in line with reduced form evidence suggesting that
investor disagreement accounts for roughly 20-30% of this variation in the data.6 Taken together,
our quantitative results suggests that information frictions may play a significant role in accounting
for a number of seemingly unrelated asset pricing anomalies.
Finally, in section 5, we generalize the key steps of our theoretical argument. We completely
dispense with parametric assumptions about economic primitives, allowing for generic distributions
of asset fundamentals, supply shocks and investor preferences. We provide a representation of asset
prices by means of a risk-neutral measure that decomposes returns into a component due to risk
premia and a component due to noisy information aggregation. The latter naturally generalizes
the notion of excess weight on tail risks described above. We then identify two sufficient conditions
on the equilibrium under which the model gives rise to excess weight on tail risks. These sufficient
conditions are satisfied by all canonical applications of noisy information aggregation models in the
existing literature.
6We also provide a numerical example which shows that our model is able to fully account for the observed spreads
with extreme levels of information frictions.
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Our paper contributes to the literature on noisy information aggregation in asset markets by
offering a variant of the canonical noisy rational expectations model that dispenses with strong
parametric assumptions about asset returns. This enables us to derive a characterization of as-
set prices and returns with noisy information aggregation by means of a risk-neutral probability
measure that displays excess weight on tail risks. These results offer a tractable alternative to
existing workhorse models that typically rely on restrictive parametric assumptions about prefer-
ences, information and asset returns (such as CARA preferences, or normally distributed signals
and dividends), and they provide novel quantifiable implications of noisy information aggregation
for asset returns. Furthermore, the results in section 5 show that these properties are a general
consequence of noisy information aggregation in asset returns, and not due to specific functional
form assumptions about information and risk preferences.
Breon-Drish (2015) analyzes non-linear and non-normal variants of the noisy REE framework in
the broad exponential family of distributions and CARA preferences. He further derives powerful
results on the incentives for information acquisition, whereas we take the information structure as
given. Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), Peress (2004) and Yuan (2005) also study non-linear models
of noisy information aggregation with a single asset market. Malamud (2015) and Chabakauri,
Yuan and Zachariadis (2020) study information aggregation in non-linear, multi-asset noisy REE
models with a rich set of state-contingent securities, exploiting spanning properties of state prices
with complete or incomplete markets. In contrast to our work, these papers all impose parametric
assumptions on the underlying asset returns, probability, information and preference structure to
fully characterize the information content of asset prices, rather than identifying properties of asset
prices that apply beyond the specifics of their environment.
Our equilibrium characterization with noisy information aggregation by means of a sufficient
statistic variable shares similarities with common value auctions; these similarities are even more
pronounced in the case with risk-neutral agents and position bounds.7 Yet whereas the auctions
literature seeks to explore under what conditions prices converge to the true fundamental values
when the number of bidders grows large, we focus instead on the departures from this competitive
limit that arise with noise and information frictions. In other words, rather than emphasizing
perfect information aggregation at the competitive limit, we emphasize the impact of frictions and
noise on prices away from this limit.
7See Wilson (1977), Milgrom (1979, 1981b), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), Kremer (2002) and Perry and
Reny (2006) for important contributions to this literature. However our results do not require the restrictions of
risk-neutrality or unit demand that typically characterize the auction-theoretic literature.
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More generally, any theory of mispricing must rely on some source of noise affecting the market,
coupled with limits to investors’ ability or willingness to exploit arbitrage (see Gromb and Vayanos,
2010, for an overview and numerous references). We show that noise trading with dispersed infor-
mation leads not just to random price fluctuations, but to systematic, predictable departures of
the price from the asset’s fundamental value. This result is independent of the exact nature of the
limits to arbitrage imposed by the model.
2 Agents, assets, information structure and financial market
There is a single risky asset with dividends given by a strictly increasing function π(·) of a stochastic




, where σ2θ denotes the
variance of fundamentals. The asset supply is stochastic and equal to s = Φ (u), where Φ (·) is




. This supply assumption is adapted
from Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006) and preserves the normality of updating from private
signals and market price without imposing any restrictions on the shape of π (·).
There is a unit measure of risk-neutral, informed investors who each observe a noisy private





β denotes the precision of private signals. Upon observing their signal, these investors submit price-
contingent demand schedules d(x, P ), corresponding to a combination of limit orders to bid for the
available supply. We assume that their positions are restricted by position limits that restrict each
investor’s demand to the unit interval [0, 1]. In other words, investors cannot short-sell and can
buy at most one unit of the asset.
Once investors submit their orders, trades are executed at a price P that is selected to clear
the market. A price P clears the market if and only if
s = D(θ, P ) ≡
∫
d (x, P ) dΦ(
√
β(x− θ)).
Let H(·|P ) denote the posterior cdf of θ, conditional on observing the market price P , and
H(·|x, P ) the investors’ posterior conditional on x and P . Given H(·|x, P ), a demand function





π(θ)dH (θ|x, P )− P
)
.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of a demand function d(x, P ), a price function P (θ, s),
and posterior beliefs H(·|P ) such that (i) d(x, P ) is optimal given H(·|x, P ); (ii) P (θ, s) clears the
7
market for all (θ, s) ∈ R× [0, 1]; and (iii) H(·|P ) satisfies Bayes’ rule whenever applicable, i.e., for
all P such that {(θ, s) : P (θ, s) = P} is non-empty.
We conclude the model description with two remarks about modeling choices.
First, in our model, investors do not observe signals directly about asset payoffs but rather about
a fundamental variable θ, and the asset payoff is some monotone function of θ.8 This formulation
separates the distribution of asset returns from the investors’ updating of beliefs, which strikes us
as a reasonable approximation of many real world financial markets. For example, equity analysts
gather information about a firm’s earnings, investment opportunities, returns to capital etc. all
of which eventually affect the dividend payouts to shareholders. A bond analyst will assess the
issuer’s solvency which depends on revenues, but also debt service, leverage etc., often summarized
in a single "distance to default" variable. An option trader will forecast where the underlying is
heading. In all these cases, the fundamental about which a trader gathers information is distinct
from the security’s payoffs and the mapping from fundamentals to payoffs is typically non-linear.
In some cases, such as different options on the same underlying asset, bonds of different maturity or
seniority, or firms that issue both equity and debt, the same fundamentals affect different securities
differently. Our model is flexible enough to accommodate any of these possibilities.
Second, assuming risk neutrality and imposing position limits is of special interest because
risk preferences disappear from the equilibrium characterization, and asset pricing implications
are driven exclusively by noisy information aggregation. The risk-neutral model with position
limits strikes us as a natural laboratory for studying cross-sectional return predictions with noisy
information aggregation, since investors should be able to diversify asset-specific risks by investing
across a wide range of assets. Such diversification can be achieved by limiting the wealth that is
invested in any given security, akin to position limits in our model.9
3 Equilibrium characterization
Our analysis proceeds in three steps: (i) a representation of the equilibrium price in terms of a
sufficient statistic z which highlights that the price responds more strongly to shocks than would
be warranted purely on informational grounds (Section 3.1), (ii) a risk-neutral representation of
expected prices and returns that displays excess weight on tail risks (Section 3.2), along with
comparative statics that derive from the interaction between excess weight on tail risks and return
8If π (θ) = θ, our model reduces to the canonical formulation in which investors observe noisy signals of dividends.
9See Albagli, Hellwig and Tsyvinski (2017) for further discussion.
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asymmetries (Section 3.3), and (iii) a mapping of excess weight on tail risks to observable moments
of earnings forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion (Section 3.4).
3.1 Sufficient statistic representation of the equilibrium price
Standard arguments imply that H(·|x, P ) is first-order stochastically increasing in the investor’s
signal x. Given risk-neutrality, there then exists a unique signal threshold x̂ (P ) such that∫
π (θ) dH (θ|x, P ) R P if and only if x R x̂ (P ) ,
and investors demand d (x, P ) = 0 if x < x̂ (P ) and d (x, P ) = 1 if x > x̂ (P ), and d (x̂ (P ) , P ) ∈
[0, 1]. Therefore, aggregate demand by informed investors equals D (θ, P ) = 1−Φ(
√
β(x̂ (P )− θ)).
Setting z ≡ x̂ (P ), market-clearing then implies 1 − Φ(
√
β(z − θ)) = s = Φ(u), or equivalently
z = θ − 1/
√






, where τ ≡ β/σ2u. The variable z represents the
information conveyed by the price, and τ the precision of the price signal.
Our first proposition provides a closed form characterization of the unique equilibrium in which
demand is non-increasing in P , consistent with executing trades through limit orders.
Proposition 1 : The unique equilibrium in which the investors’ demand is non-increasing in P
is characterized by the equilibrium price function
Pπ(z) = E (π (θ) |x = z, z) =
∫
π(θ)dΦ
θ − γP ·
(










1/σ2θ + β + τ
.
Proposition 1 represents the equilibrium price in terms of an endogenous state variable or
sufficient statistic z for the information conveyed through the asset price. This sufficient statistic
corresponds to the private signal of the marginal investor who is just indifferent between buying
and not buying the asset.
The expected dividend conditional on z instead takes the form


















Hence the equilibrium price differs from the expected dividend by responding more strongly to
the market signal z than would be justified purely based on the information conveyed through z.
We term this excess price sensitivity the updating wedge.10
10To our knowledge, the only prior discussion of this updating wedge is by Vives (2008), in the context of the
CARA-normal model.
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This updating wedge results from market clearing with dispersed information and is perfectly
consistent with Bayesian rationality. The equilibrium price is represented as the marginal investor’s
dividend expectation. An increase from z to z′ (due to an increase in θ or a decrease in s) conveys
positive news about θ and thus raises dividend expectations for all traders in the market. In
addition, an increase in θ or a decrease in s shift the asset demand and supply. To clear the
market, the private signal of the marginal investor pricing the asset then has to increase from z
to z′, hence the marginal investor becomes even more optimistic relative to the other investors in
the market. The expression for the equilibrium price incorporates these two effects through the
sufficient statistic z appearing once as the price signal and once as the marginal investor’s private
signal. In contrast, the Bayesian posterior of θ given P only includes the first effect.
3.2 Risk-neutral measure and excess weight on tail risks
We use the equilibrium characterization of Proposition 1 to represent the expected price E (P (z)) =∫
π (θ) dĤ (θ) as an expectation of dividends under a risk-neutral measure Ĥ.11 We then derive
empirical predictions from the comparison between the risk-neutral and the physical prior.



















The risk-neutral prior differs from the physical prior through a shift in means and a mean-
preserving spread, a property that we refer to as excess weight on tail risks: controlling for the
mean θ̄, Ĥ(·) places higher weight on realizations of θ in both upper and lower tails. This property
distinguishes the risk-neutral measure under dispersed information from a counterpart that incor-
porates pure risk premia or aggregate supply effects, which merely shift probability mass from the
upper to the lower tail realizations, analogous to the shift θ̄ in the mean of the distribution.
The following representation of σ2P provides some intuition for excess weight on tail risks:
σ2P = V ar (E (θ|x = z, z)) + E (V ar (θ|x = z, z)) = V ar (E (θ|x = z, z)) + E (V ar (θ|x, z))
= V ar (θ + E (θ|x = z, z)− E (θ|x, z)) > σ2θ .
Here, the first equality applies Blackwell’s variance decomposition to the risk-neutral measure. The
second equality uses the fact that V ar (θ|x, z) is independent of x. The third equality follows from
11In contrast to the risk-neutral measure with no-arbitrage, the measure Ĥ includes asset-specific factors relating
to the severity of information aggregation frictions in a specific market.
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cov (θ,E (θ|x, z) |x, z) = 0. The last inequality follows from the fact that E (θ|x = z, z)− E (θ|x, z)
is linear in x− z and independent of θ.
Excess weight on tail risks arises if and only if V ar (E (θ|x = z, z)) > V ar (E (θ|x, z)) and is
thus equivalent to another equilibrium property of noisy information aggregation models: namely,
that conditional expectations under the risk-neutral measure are strictly more variable than the
expectations of an arbitrary informed trader in the market. But this result emerges because supply
shocks introduce fluctuations in risk-neutral expectations that are orthogonal to the private signals
of fundamentals that are aggregated through the price.
3.3 Asset pricing implications of excess weight on tail risks
Taking expectations and using integration by parts, we represent the expected price premium as















































summarizes the impact of the shift in means which is governed by the average
asset supply.12 The term W (π;σP ) summarizes the impact of the mean-preserving spread on the
expected price premium. For reasons that will quickly become apparent, we will refer to W (π, σP )
as the skewness premium. Our next definition provides a partial order on returns that we use for
the comparative statics of W (π, σP ).
Definition 1 (Cash flow risks) :
(i) Dividend function π has symmetric risk if π (θ1)−π (θ2) = π (−θ2)−π (−θ1) for all θ1 > θ2 ≥ 0.
(ii) Dividend function π is dominated by upside risk if π (θ1) − π (θ2) ≥ π (−θ2) − π (−θ1) , and
dominated by downside risk if π (θ1)− π (θ2) ≤ π (−θ2)− π (−θ1) , for all θ1 > θ2 ≥ 0.
(iii) Dividend function π1 has more upside risk than π2 if π1 − π2 is dominated by upside risk.
This definition classifies payoff functions by comparing marginal gains and losses at fixed dis-
tances from the prior mean to determine whether the payoff exposes its owner to bigger payoff
fluctuations on the upside or the downside. Any linear dividend function has symmetric risks, any
12With position limits, the average supply effect captures the role of “cash-in-the-market” or short-sales constraints,
by which average prices are a decreasing function of the expected asset supply. With risk-averse investors and no
position limits, the risk premium generates a similar average supply effect.
11
convex function is dominated by upside risks, and any concave dividend function is dominated by
downside risks, but the classification also extends to non-linear functions with symmetric gains and
losses, non-convex functions with upside risk or non-concave functions with downside risk.
Securities are easy to classify according to this definition when the fundamental and the return
are both observable (for example in the case of defaultable bonds or options). But even without
observing fundamentals directly, upside and downside risk directly translate into the distribution
of returns being more spread out above or below the median of the return distribution, if the
fundamental distribution is symmetric. Intuitively, this means that a security that is dominated
by upside (downside) risk has positive (negative) skewness.
Proposition 2 (Sign and comparative statics of W (π, σP )):
(i) If π has symmetric risk, then W (π;σP ) = 0. If π is dominated by upside risk, then W (π;σP )
is positive and increasing in σP . If π is dominated by downside risk, then W (π;σP ) is negative and
decreasing in σP . Moreover, limσP→∞|W (π;σP ) | =∞, whenever limθ→∞|π (θ) + π (−θ) | =∞.
(ii) If π1 has more upside risk than π2, then W (π1;σP ) − W (π2;σP ) is non-negative and
increasing in σP .
Proposition 2 shows how the skewness premium arises as a combination of asymmetry in the
dividend profile π and noisy information aggregation, or excess weight on tail risks (σP > σθ). The
skewness premium is positive for upside risks, negative for downside risks and larger for assets with
larger return asymmetries. Furthermore, the skewness premium increases and can grow arbitrarily
large as excess weight on tail risks becomes more important, provided that the return asymmetry
does not vanish from the tails. Finally, price impact of information aggregation frictions and
return asymmetry are mutually reinforcing, since the skewness premium has increasing differences
in upside risk and excess weight on tail risks.
Mathematically, these results follow directly from our interpretation of the skewness premium
as a mean-preserving spread. This mean-preserving spread becomes more valuable when the payoff
function shifts towards more upside risk.
The intuition for proposition 2 comes from the interaction of π (·) with excess weight on tail
risks. With symmetric π (·), excess weight on tail risks does not affect the average price: over-pricing
when z is high is just offset by under-pricing when z is low. When instead π (·) is dominated by
upside risk, the upper tail risk of dividends is more important than the lower tail. Hence over-
pricing on the upside is larger than under-pricing on the downside, which results in a positive price
premium. When instead π (·) is dominated by downside risk, the price premium is negative.
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Below, we map excess weight on tail risks to forecast dispersion. Our model thus predicts a
negative relation between skewness or upside risk and returns, whose strength is reinforced by fore-
cast dispersion. Moreover, it derives a positive relation between forecast dispersion and returns for
securities with downside risks. These predictions clearly distinguish our theory from heterogeneous
priors models in which forecast dispersion proxies for investor disagreement, which generates a
positive option value of resale regardless of a securities return structure. We will return to these
predictions below when relating our model to the empirical evidence.
3.4 Quantifying excess weight on tail risks
We now map the ratio σP /σθ into two statistics that can be estimated using data on investor’s
forecasts of fundamentals. This will allow us to translate the comparative statics of Proposition






1/σ2θ + β + τ
)
as a
measure of forecast accuracy, and construct an empirical counterpart by computing the forecast







as the cross-sectional standard deviation of forecast errors normalized by the
standard deviation of fundamentals. This yields the following representation of excess weight on






γP (1− γP )
γP (1− γP )− D̃2
(5)
Representation (5) uses only fundamentals and forecast data to discipline excess weight on tail
risks, without relying on any market data (asset returns and prices). The representations of D̃ and
γP in turn allow us to back out the primitive parameters β and σ
2
u. We can therefore calibrate
these informational parameters using data on earnings and earnings forecasts, and then test the
model asset pricing implications on market data.13
Furthermore, equation (5) implies that forecast dispersion drives almost all the variation in
σP /σθ, unless forecast accuracy takes on extreme values. Conditional on D̃, σP /σθ displays a
symmetric U-shape in forecast accuracy, reaching a minimum at γP = 1/2, and diverging to infinity
when γP (1− γP )→ D̃2. But for most of its range, the increase in σP /σθ is very mild as we move
13The chosen representation in terms of forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion is by no means the only repre-
sentation possible. For example initially we defined σP /σθ in terms of the response coefficients γP and γV , where γP
is interpreted as forecast accuracy, and γV represents a simple measure of market accuracy or price informativeness,
which can be computed as the R2 obtained by regressing fundamentals (earnings) on prices. The same parameters
also matter for price volatility or return predictability.
13
away from γP = 0.5. For example, consider a value of D̃ = 0.2, which is close to the median value
of forecast dispersion in the sample of Guntay and Hackbarth (2010). This implies a minimum
value of σP /σθ = 1.0235. But σP /σθ does not exceed 1.0244 for values of forecast accuracy in the
range of [0.25, 0.75]. Therefore, the lower bound on σP /σθ that we obtain by setting γP = 0.5 is
actually a very good approximation for a remarkably wide range of forecast accuracies, and forecast
dispersion D̃ emerges as a natural proxy variable for excess weight on tail risks.14
The key steps in this section were the characterization of a risk-neutral measure that displays
excess weight on tail risks and the characterization of asset pricing implications of excess weight on
tail risks by Proposition 2. Hence, any theory that rationalizes excess weight on tail risks of the risk
neutral measure will yield similar asset pricing predictions. Noisy information aggregation allows
us to tie excess weight on tail risks to observable moments of forecast dispersion and accuracy,
which leads to an immediate test of the theory. In Section 5, we generalize these steps beyond the
present model with risk-neutral investors and position limits.
4 Dispersed information and asset pricing puzzles
Proposition 2 offers three qualitative predictions: returns to skewness, returns to disagreement,
and positive interaction effects. In this section, we first discuss empirical evidence supporting these
predictions qualitatively. We then calibrate excess weight on tail risks to match forecast dispersion
and forecast accuracy, and explore to what extent our model is also able to quantitatively account
for empirical facts.15
Prediction 1 (Returns to skewness): Price premia are positive (negative) and return pre-
mia negative (positive) for securities dominated by upside (downside) risk. Price premia are in-
creasing and returns decreasing with skewness or upside risk.
A sizable empirical literature documents a negative relationship between expected skewness
and equity returns. For example, Conrad, Dittmar and Ghysels (2013; CDG henceforth) estimate
skewness of equity returns from option prices, Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010) from forecasting
14In principle, if we represent excess weight on tail risks as a function of two empirical proxies, empirical tests w.r.t.
one proxy are valid only if they control for the other - otherwise there is likely to be omitted variable bias if the two
proxies are correlated with each other. However, since forecast accuracy has so little effect over much of its range,
omitted variable bias is much less of a concern when we test predictions regarding forecast dispersion. This offers
further validation for using forecast dispersion as a proxy for excess weight on tail risks.
15Our model may potentially account also for options prices, announcement effects or excess price volatility, but
addressing those would take us too far afield from the main predictions of Proposition 2.
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regressions. Both studies then sort stocks by expected skewness and find that securities with
higher skewness earn about 0.7% lower average returns per month, equivalent to more than 8%
of yearly excess returns for the strategy of going long/short on low/high skewness stocks. Green
and Hwang (2012) find that IPOs with high expected skewness earn significantly more negative
abnormal returns in the following one to five years. Zhang (2013) shows that skewness correlates
positively with the book-to-market factor and thus helps account for the value premium.
Existing explanations for these empirical findings rely on investor preferences for positive skew-
ness.16 Proposition 2 offers an alternative explanation for a negative returns to skewness as the
result of dispersed information and excess weight on tail risks. In contrast to preference-based
theories, this explanation also links returns to skewness and disagreement.
Returns to skewness also manifest themselves in bond markets through the credit spread puzzle,
i.e. the difficulty to reconcile high levels of corporate bonds spreads with historical default data
in standard models pricing credit risk. Huang and Huang (2012) calibrate a number of structural
models to historical default data and show that they all produce spreads relative to treasuries
that fall significantly short of their empirical counterparts. This shortfall is most severe for short
maturity, high investment grade securities, which are almost as safe as treasuries of similar maturity,
yet pay significantly larger return premia.17 Proposition 2 offers an intuitive explanation for this
16In Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Brunnermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007), overinvestment in highly skewed
securities, along with under-diversification, results from a model of optimal expectations. Barberis and Huang (2008)
show that cumulative prospect theory results in a demand for skewness or a preference for stocks with lottery-like
features. Mitton and Vorkink (2007) develop a model in which investors have heterogeneous preference for skewness.
17Among recent contributions to this literature, Chen (2010) considers a dynamic model with time variation
in macroeconomic conditions in a context of long-run risks, endogenous default decisions by firms, and recursive
preferences. He and Milbradt (2014) study the role of interacting market liquidity with endogenous default decisions.
Chen et al. (2018) show that the interaction of all these mechamisms can deliever credit spreads that come closer
to the empirical counterparts. However, most purely risk- and liquidity-based models account for at most a small
fraction of the level and volatility of spreads that are observed in practice, especially so for short-horizon investment
grade bonds.
Our predictions for credit spreads also speak to the empirical asset pricing literature linking credit spreads and
equity returns (See Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev, 2010 and citations therein). Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev
(2010) reconcile co-movement of equity returns and credit spreads through a structural model of capital structure
with Epstein-Zin preferences and time-varying counter-cyclical default risks. McQuade (2018) obtains similar results
by introducing stochastic volatility as a second risk factor that is priced by the representative investor. Our analysis
instead links credit spreads and (levered) equity returns through dispersed investor information and excess weight on
tail risks, which allows us to connect with a different set of stylized facts regarding returns to investor disagreement.
We leave a multi-asset version of our noisy information aggregation model to study return co-movement and capital
structure choices for future work.
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puzzle by arguing that with dispersed information the market has a tendency to be overly concerned
with the tail risk of default, relative to actual default probabilities.
Prediction 2 (Returns to disagreement): Returns to disagreement are negative (positive)
with upside (downside) risks.
A growing literature uses forecast dispersion as a proxy for disagreement. Diether, Malloy and
Sherbina (2002; DMS henceforth) sort stocks by the dispersion of earnings forecasts across analysts
covering each security. They find that stocks in the highest dispersion quintile have monthly
returns which are about 0.62% lower than those in the lowest dispersion quintile, amounting to a
yearly excess return over 7% for the strategy of going long/short on low/high dispersion stocks.
They interpret this result as evidence consistent with the hypothesis of Miller (1977) of investor
disagreement interacting with short-selling constraints.18 Yu (2011) reports similar results and
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) document that an alternative measure of stock risk premia,
the cost of capital, is also negatively related to analyst forecast dispersion.
Guntay and Hackbarth (2010; GH henceforth) perform a similar analysis for bond yields but
reach the opposite conclusion as DMS: yield spreads and bond returns are increasing with forecast
dispersion, and spreads are 0.14% higher and returns 0.08% higher in the top dispersion quintile,
which amounts to a yearly excess return of about 1% for the strategy long/short on high/low dis-
persion bonds. GH replicate DMS’ result of negative returns to disagreement in equity returns
in their sample (though the measured excess returns are smaller), which suggests a systematic
difference in returns to disagreement for equity and bond markets. GH interpret returns to dis-
agreement as a proxy for risk premia. Carlin, Longstaff and Matoba (2014) confirm GH’s results
for mortgage-backed securities.
Proposition 2 reconciles these seemingly contradictory empirical results by noting that studies
that find negative returns to disagreement focus on securities with upside risk, while studies that
find positive returns to disagreement focus on securities where downside risk is dominant.
Prediction 3 (Interaction effects): There is positive interaction between returns to dis-
agreement and returns to skewness.
Evidence on interaction effects between skewness and disagreement is more limited. Yu (2011)
sorts stocks by book-to-market ratio and disagreement and reports that the value premium increases
from 4.3% annual return with the lowest tercile disagreement to 11.3% with the highest tercile, and
the returns to disagreement range from −0.26% annual for the highest quintile of book-to-market
ratios to −7.2% for the lowest quintile. Following Zhang (2013) who interprets book-to-market
18They rule out a risk-based explanation for the anomaly by controling for stocks exposure to standard risk factors
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ratios as a proxy for skewness, these results suggest substantial interaction between returns to
skewness and disagreement in equity returns.19
For bond markets, GH report that the effect of disagreement on spreads and yields doubles in
high leverage or low-rated rated firms, two plausible proxies for downside risks. In a regression of
credit spreads on leverage, disagreement and their interaction, the interaction term turns out to be
highly significant, but disagreement and leverage are insignificant on their own. These empirical
results suggest that returns to skewness and disagreement interact in the data along the lines
suggested by our theoretical results.20
The ability to account for returns to skewness and disagreement in both equity and bond markets
distinguishes our theory from heterogeneous prior models with short-sales constraints following
Miller (1977): in those models prices incorporate a resale option value that lowers future returns
irrespective of the asset characteristics. They are therefore unable to explain why these comparative
statics would be different for different security classes such as stocks and bonds.
Indeed, the ambiguous empirical relationship between disagreement and asset returns remains
one of the major unresolved puzzles in asset pricing. Perhaps Carlin, Longstaff and Matoba (2014)
put it best: “Understanding how disagreement affects security prices in financial markets is one of
the most important issues in finance. ...Despite the fundamental nature of this issue, though, there
still remains significant controversy in the literature about how disagreement risk affects expected
returns and asset prices.” To our knowledge, ours is the first explanation that can reconcile the
seemingly contradictory empirical results as direct predictions of a unified theory, tractable enough
to encompass assets with different underlying cash-flow risks.
19More specifically, Zhang (2013) first documents strong positive correlation between book-to-market ratios and
skewness of returns, and then shows that the explanatory power of book-to-market ratios for returns is significantly
lower when controling for skewness.
20Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2020) question the statistical robustness of various return anomalies in equity markets
including some of the studies we mention here. They replicate existing studies on a uniform sample and emphasize
the importance of small capitalizations and equal vs. value weighting in estimating return anomalies. In their study,
returns to skewness remain small and insignificant, but by focusing on the impact of skewness in realized returns, they
do not directly replicate CDG or Boyer Mitton and Vorkink (2010), which use measures of expected future skewness.
They replicate DMS and show that value-weighting leads to much lower and statistically insignificant returns to
disagreement. This suggests that returns to disagreement are concentrated in markets with small capitalizations, a
finding which is consistent with the replication of DMS by GH for a subsample of firms that are active also in bond
markets. Finally, their estimates of the value premium are similar to the ones reported in Yu (2011). Our predictions
are broadly consistent with the results of Hou, Xue and Zhang (2020), if one assumes that larger markets are more
liquid and less subject to noisy information aggregation frictions.
17
Figure 1: Forecast Dispersion vs. Accuracy (Scatter Plots)
 
4.1 Measuring information frictions
Here we construct simple measures of excess weight on tail risks from analysts’ earnings forecasts.
Using the representation (5), we infer excess weight on tail risks from measures of forecast dispersion
D̃ and forecast accuracy γP for a cross-section of listed firms. These statistics are derived from the
I.B.E.S. data base of analyst forecasts of earnings per share, but based on the data treatments in
GH and Straub and Ulbricht (2015; SU henceforth).21 The database reports a measure of forecast
dispersion along with a consensus or average earnings forecast for each fim in the sample. Forecast
accuracy is computed from average forecasts and realized earnings as the variance of forecast errors
relative to the unconditional variance of earnings. In the GH sample, these measures are computed
for all firms at a relatively short horizon (within quarter), using data from 1987-1998. In the SU
sample, these measures are computed using the whole I.B.E.S. sample (1976-2016) for a subset of
firms for which we have at least 10 years of forecast data, and forecasts are made over a slightly
longer 8 month horizon.
Figure 1 shows scatter plots of forecast accuracy (horizontal axis) and forecast dispersion (ver-
tical axis) in the two data sets, with negative forecast accuracy (γP < 0) corresponding to a case
where the forecast error variance exceeds the volatility of earnings. The blue + marks correspond
to firms that satisfy γP (1− γP ) > D̃2, the red x-marks correspond to firms that do not satisfy
this restriction. If this condition is not satisfied then the measured forecast dispersion and forecast
accuracy cannot be consistent with our model (or more generally with any common prior, linear
21We thank these four authors for sharing their treatment of the raw data with us.
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Source SU restricted SU GH restricted GH
N 2103 1839 (87.4%) 6820 4335 (63.6%)
Relative Mean 0.172 0.143 0.293 0.177
Forecast St. Dev. 0.2 0.084 0.305 0.108
Dispersion 10% 0.053 0.051 0.061 0.048
D̃ 25% 0.085 0.079 0.117 0.092
Median 0.137 0.126 0.214 0.16
75% 0.213 0.189 0.368 0.251
90% 0.315 0.257 0.601 0.342
Forecast Mean 0.53 0.689 0.611 0.748
Accuracy St. Dev. 1.14 0.24 0.988 0.236
γP 10% 0.012 0.325 0.124 0.378
25% 0.397 0.526 0.54 0.627
Median 0.695 0.744 0.818 0.822
75% 0.873 0.89 0.947 0.937





-0.84 -0.519 -0.282 -0.34
Table 1: Forecast Dispersion and Forecast Accuracy
projection model), and the friction parameter is not well defined.
In both samples, the majority of firms lie in an area with high forecast accuracy and low forecast
dispersion, which corresponds to low levels of information friction in the market. But there is a
non-negligible subset of firms with less accurate earnings forecasts and higher levels of forecast
dispersion, even among those firms for which γP (1− γP ) > D̃2.
Table 1 reports summary statistics (mean, median, 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles) for
forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy in the two datasets, as well as the raw correlation between
these two measures. We report these statistics both for the full sample, and for a restricted sample
of firms in which γP (1− γP ) > D̃2. The proportion of firms that are excluded in the restricted
sample drops from 36% in the GH sample to less than 13% in the SU sample, which only considers
firms with at least 10 years of forecast data. This suggests that violations of the γP (1− γP ) > D̃2
condition may stem from errors in the estimates of earnings volatility or forecast accuracy that
are based on limited sample sizes. In particular, in contrast to GH, SU has no firms with high
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Figure 2: Forecast Dispersion (Cumulative Distribution)
 
forecast dispersion and high forecast accuracy - the restricted SU sample only excludes firms in
which measured forecast accuracy is implausibly low, given forecast dispersion.
Figure 2 displays the cross-sectional distribution of forecast dispersion in the two samples and
shows that, consistent with the moments reported in Table 1, the distribution of forecast dispersion
is highly skewed with a fat upper tail, and the mean of the distribution far higher than the median,
in both samples. The distribution of forecast accuracy on the other hand is more uniformly spread
with a significant lower tail. In addition, forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy are negatively
correlated in the cross-section, but the correlation is far from perfect.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the cross-sectional distributions of the excess weight on
tail risks σP /σθ that is implied by the joint distribution of forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy
in the restricted sample for which σP /σθ is well-defined. Figure 3 displays the corresponding cross-
sectional distribution. The table and figure both confirm that the distribution of excess weight on
tail risks is highly right-skewed in both samples: frictions are small for most firms (the median firm
in the GH sample has less than 2% of excess weight on tail risks, σP /σθ < 1.02, while the median
firm in the SU sample has σP /σθ < 1.01), but the mean level of frictions is much higher than the
median (1.027 in SU and 1.084 in GH) and driven by an upper tail of firms for which measured
information frictions can be fairly substantial.
Table 2 also provides summary statistics for the lower bound on σP /σθ constructed from forecast
dispersion by setting forecast accuracy equal to 1/2, and reports the correlation between σP /σθ,
forecast dispersion and accuracy, and this lower bound. Excess weight on tail risks is only weakly
20
Figure 3: Excess Weight on Tail Risks (Cumulative Distribution)
 
Figure 4: Excess weight on tail risks vs. Lower Bound
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Source restricted SU (N=1839) restricted GH (N=4335)
σP
σθ
Lower bound σPσθ Lower bound
Mean 1.027 1.021 1.084 1.044
St. Dev. 0.091 0.054 0.260 0.113
10% 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001
25% 1.003 1.003 1.005 1.004
Median 1.009 1.008 1.019 1.014
75% 1.022 1.021 1.059 1.041






















Table 2: Excess Weight on Tail Risks
negatively correlated with forecast accuracy, but significantly positively correlated with forecast
dispersion, and this correlation becomes even stronger if we replace forecast dispersion with the
lower bound on frictions. Figure 4 displays a scatter plot of firm-level frictions σP /σθ − 1 on the
vertical axis against its lower bound imputed from forecast dispersion on the horizontal axis, in a
log-log scale. Except for very few outliers, our measure of frictions lines up very closely with the
lower bound. This confirms that the variation in excess weight on tail risks is mostly driven by
forecast dispersion.
To summarize, our data suggest that excess weight on tail risks is likely to be small for most
firms, i.e. less than 1.02 in the SU sample and less than 1.05 in the GH sample for 75% of firms, but
quite large in the top quartile of the distribution. We show next that the impact on asset returns
can nevertheless be fairly significant.
4.2 Returns to skewness
We now argue that our model can generate quantitatively significant skewness premia with realistic
levels of information frictions, and that it can account for the observed negative relation between
skewness and returns.
We focus on the empirical results of CDG. Define π (θ) = ekx(θ) such that x (·) is distributed
according to a beta distribution. We select the distributional parameters of the beta distribution
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Model Data
D̃ 0.10 0.206 0.228 0.301 0.35
σP /σθ 1.005 1.027 1.035 1.084 1.163 Return Skew Vol
Low 0.11 0.59 0.77 1.87 3.64 0.57 -2.814 31.51
Medium 0.05 0.27 0.36 0.87 1.70 0.21 -0.98 32.26
High -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.22 0.026 31.14
H-L -0.11 -0.59 -0.78 -1.89 -3.69 -0.79
M-L -0.06 -0.31 -0.41 -1.00 -1.94 -0.37
Table 3: Returns to skewness: model vs data
and k so that π (·) matches the skewness and volatility of the different portfolio bins in CDG (Table
II). We perform this exercise for skewness inferred from options with three months to maturity,
and the respective low, medium and high-skewness portfolios.22
We then vary the information frictions parameters β and σu so that σP /σθ falls within the
range suggested in section 4.1. We set forecast accuracy γP to 0.75, which falls between the sample
means and medians of the restricted SU and GH samples, and then vary D̃ between values of 0.1
and 0.35. With these numbers σP /σθ ranges from 1.005 to 1.163, β from 0.16 to 1.96, and σu from
0.24 to 1.37. In all our calibrations, we set θ̄ = 0 to focus exclusively on the role of excess weight
on tail risks.23
Table 3 compares model-implied returns to their empirical counterparts. Its rows represent
the portfolios in CDG constructed from options of 3-months to maturity and sorted by skewness.
The last three columns report empirical returns, skewness and volatility of these portfolios. The
first five columns report the model-implied monthly expected returns (in percentage points) for
different levels of forecast dispersion and excess weight on tail risks (reported in the top two lines).
The values of D̃ = 0.206 and D̃ = 0.301 match, respectively, the mean excess weight on tail risks
in the SU and GH samples, the values of D̃ = 0.1 and D̃ = 0.35 have been added to illustrate
the quantitative results of the model for the lower half and the top quintiles of the distribution of
22We ran the same simulations for skewness measures constructed from 12 months options and for idiosyncratic
skewness in CDG, and found the same quantitative results.
23We checked the robustness of our quantitative results with respect to variations in θ̄ that bring back average





















Since θ̄ = −D̃σθū, return asymmetry also interacts with forecast dispersion through average supply effects, but these
interactions scale with D̃2 and are thus an order of magnitude smaller than the effects of excess weight on tail risks.
These results are available upon request.
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σP /σθ, using the GH-sample as a benchmark.
Model-implied return premia are negligible for small- to medium dispersion levels, but then grow
exponentially for levels of forecast dispersion in the upper quartile of the distribution reported in
Table 1, and they far exceed their empirical counterparts for dispersion levels in the top decile.
In addition, return premia appear to grow approximately linearly with the implied excess weight
on tail risks, σP /σθ. We can therefore assess the model’s predictive power for average returns by
focusing on a calibration that matches the average level of σP /σθ. Excess weight on tail risks
of σP /σθ = 1.035 in the middle column match the observed returns to skewness almost exactly.
This value is somewhat above the sample mean from SU, but well below the one from GH. Using
the sample mean from SU as a conservative estimate, our model accounts for at least 75% of the
observed return premia, while using the sample mean from GH, the model generates returns to
skewness more than twice as large as the ones in the data.
Our model thus accounts very well for the return differences between high and low skewness
portfolios, even if it doesn’t match the level of returns.
4.3 The credit spread puzzle
Here we argue that our theory provides a natural explanation for the credit spread puzzle based
on excess weight on tail risks. For a given value of information frictions σP /σθ > 1, the risk-
neutral measure treats a x-standard deviation event as if it was a xσθ/σP -standard deviation
event. Therefore, if the ex ante probability of default is not too high, the risk-neutral measure will
systematically over-estimate default risks, resulting in under-pricing of defaultable bonds. More-
over, this under-pricing becomes more important in relative terms when bonds are deemed safer.
Consider a special case of our model in which the asset payoff is binary: π (θ) = 1 for θ > θ







































































This characterization delivers the following two comparative statics results, for θ̄ ≤ 0:24
24θ̄ ≤ 0 allows for positive average supply, akin to a risk premium for default risk.
24

















ing in σP , for θ < θ̄.






is increasing in θ and converges to 0 as θ → −∞.
Therefore, we confirm analytically that excess weight on tail risks increases bond spreads and
expected returns, and that these effects are more important for safer bonds, i.e. as θ → −∞.
In Table 4, we illustrate these points numerically. The first four columns of Table 4 report
empirical moments for bond maturities of 4 years, taken from Huang and Huang (2012):25 the
cumulative probability of default over the holding period, transformed into an annualized “loss
rate” (in basis points) which corresponds to the yield spread at which the bondholder just breaks




in our model, and the L/S ratio between







The next two columns report model-implied spreads in levels (and as percentage of the data)
and the L/S ratio of the structural model of bond pricing in Huang and Huang (2012), which
we use as a reference point for our calibration. These columns summarize well the credit spread
puzzle: Model-implied spreads are far lower than their data counterparts, especially for investment
grade (Baa and above) bonds. This failure can be traced to lack of sufficient variation in the
model-implied L/S ratio: In the data, default risk premia vanish at a much slower rate than the
corresponding default risks in higher ratings categories. This is difficult to reconcile with standard
risk preferences which typically display bounded aversion to small pay-off risks.
We set c = 0.5 to match empirical recovery rate estimates in case of default, set θ to match
observed default frequencies for bonds with different ratings. We set θ̄ = 0 and vary σP /σθ: we
set forecast accuracy to γP to 0.75, corresponding to the median of the restricted G-H sample,
and then vary D̃ to match friction levels of σPσθ = 1.084 (D̃ = 0.301),
σP
σθ
= 1.163 (D̃ = 0.35), and
σP
σθ
= 1.74 (D̃ = 0.414). These correspond, respectively, to the average level of frictions in the GH
sample, the top quartile of forecast dispersion in GH, and the level of frictions under which the
model matches the spread for Baa bonds exactly.
The last six columns report the model-implied average spread and L/S ratio for each ratings
category at the three levels of information frictions.
Like the structural bond pricing model, our dispersed information model falls well short of
accounting for the observed level of credit spreads, especially for investment grade bonds. For
realistic levels of excess weight on tail risks, the model accounts for anywhere from roughly 10%












Pr(default) Loss Rate Spread L/S Spread L/S Spread L/S Spread L/S Spread L/S
Aaa 0.04% 0.5 55 0.9% 1.1 (2%) 46% 1.4 (2.6%) 35% 2.9 (5.2%) 18% 42 (77%) 1.2%
Aa 0.23% 2.9 65 4.4% 6 (9.2%) 48% 6.2 (9.6%) 46% 11 (16%) 27% 80 (124%) 3.6%
A 0.35% 4.4 96 4.6% 10 (10%) 44% 8.2 (8.5%) 53% 13 (14%) 33% 91 (94%) 5.1%
Baa 1.24% 15.5 158 9.8% 32 (20%) 49% 29 (18%) 54% 41 (26%) 38% 158 (100%) 9.8%
Ba 8.51% 109 320 34% 172 (54%) 63% 142 (44%) 77% 168 (53%) 65% 333 (104%) 33%
B 23.3% 301 470 66% 446 (95%) 70% 397 (84%) 78% 424 (90%) 73% 558 (119%) 56%
Table 4: Credit spreads: model vs data
to 35% of spreads on high quality (Baa and above) bonds. This ratio is consistent with empirical
results in GH and in Buraschi, Trojani and Vedolin (2014) who suggest that forecast dispersion
accounts for about 20%-30% of the observed levels and variation in credit spreads in the data.
Furthermore, our model generates substantially more variation in the L/S ratio than the struc-
tural bond pricing model, and is able to account for a much lower ratio of expected losses relative
to spreads for investment grade bonds. In the data, this ratio varies from 66% for the lowest ratings
category to 5% for investment grade bonds and less than 1% for Aaa bonds - a variation by a factor
of 70 between the highest and the lowest ratings category. The structural model matches the L/S
ratio for the lowest ratings categories, but is unable to account for its steep decline in the highest
categories, since the L/S ratio stays above 45%, it accounts for a variation of at most a factor 1.5.
With σPσθ = 1.163, the dispersed information model can account for L/S ratios as low as 18% for
4-year Aaa bonds, equivalent to a variation by a factor 4.26
26Feldhütter and Schaefer (2018) question the existence of a credit spread puzzle by arguing that historical default
data by ratings category offer only a very noisy estimate of underlying default risks. They offer a model-based
alternative that exploits information on leverage and defaults across maturities and ratings categories, to argue that
default probabilities do not vary nearly as much across ratings as suggested by Huang and Huang (2012). Bai,
Goldstein and Yang (2020) on the other hand question the estimates by Feldhütter and Schaefer (2018) by arguing
that model-consistent estimates should use market rather than book values of debt to measure leverage. The model-
based estimates extrapolate default boundaries estimated from low-rated firms for which defaults are frequent to
higher ratings categories for which defaults are far more infrequent. The gap between market- and book-value of
debt for low-rated firms then generates a substantial bias in the estimated default boundary and the variation in the
estimated default probability across ratings categories.
Table 3 of Bai, Goldstein and Yang (2020) summarizes the difference between the historical default frequencies and
the respective estimates using market value and book value of debt. Using their numbers, we can compute L/S-ratios
for the different estimates. For bonds with 5 years to maturity, the L/S-ratios vary by a factor of 20 across ratings
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In the last two columns we have set forecast dispersion to match the return on Baa bonds, and
we have then calculated the model-implied spreads for all other ratings categories and maturities.
While the required excess weight on tail risks may seem implausibly large, this calibration matches
the overall level and variation of spreads across categories remarkably well. This result suggests
that severe information frictions have the potential to fully account for the credit spread puzzle by
generating sufficient variation in the L/S-ratio to match the observed variation in the data.
Finally, we explore the robustness of our results w.r.t. θ̄. By setting θ̄ = −0.2 and σPσθ = 1, we
replicate the structural model of Huang and Huang (2012) almost exactly with Spreads varying from
1.1 to 446 basis points and the L/S ratio varying from 44% to 66% as we vary credit ratings from
Aaa to B. Allowing a similar shift in the mean of the risk-neutral distribution uniformly increases
spreads for bonds of all ratings categories, which helps in accounting for the relative magnitude
of spreads on investment grade bonds but also results in over-shooting for spreads on speculative
grades.
In summary, our model offers a simple explanation for the credit spread puzzle. To account for
the puzzle, one must explain why return premia that vanish at a lower rate than the underlying
default risks for highly rated bonds, as illustrated by the declining L/S ratio. Our explanation is







converges to 0 at a much slower rate than the actual default rate Φ (θ/σθ).
Our model abstracts from many additional factors to generate quantitatively realistic credit
spreads. Nevertheless, the fact that this simple model does as well or better than substantially
more sophisticated structural models of credit spreads along one key dimension, the L/S-ratio,
suggests that dispersed information may play a significant role in isolation or in combination with
other factors determining credit spreads. In Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2014) we develop
a fully dynamic dispersed information model of bond pricing and discuss its quantitative fit for
explaining the credit spread puzzle.
categories in the estimates derived from historical default frequencies, by a factor of 2.5 in the estimates derived from
book value of debt, and by a factor of 8 in the estimates derived from market value of debt. The structural model
estimates reported by Bai, Goldstein and Yang (2020) in turn suggest a variation in the L/S ratio of at most a factor
of 1.3 for models using either book or market value of debt, which is even lower than the factor of 1.5 derived from
the estimates of Huang and Huang (see Table 4).
As a robustness check, we also calibrated our model to match the three series of default probabilities reported in
Bai, Goldstein and Yang (2020). Our model generates a variation in the L/S-ratio by a factor of 2 to 5 for the different
estimates of default risk with plausible degrees of information frictions. Our model with dispersed information thus
accounts for a much larger fraction of the variation in the L/S-ratio than the structural model estimates reported in
Bai, Goldstein and Yang (2020), regardless of the estimated default probabilities one chooses to match.
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4.4 Returns to disagreement
DMS (table VI) report that stocks in the highest quintile of analyst forecast dispersion have monthly
returns that are about 0.62% lower than those in the lowest dispersion quintile, equivalent to an
annual return premium of −7.7%. GH replicate these results with a subset of firms that are also
active in bonds markets and confirm their finding, though with a lower level of excess returns, of
0.26% per month, or −3.2% per year. The firms in the GH sample correspond to the highest size
and lowest dispersion quintiles of the DMS sample. This accounts for most of the difference in
returns to disagreement between DMS and GH.27
We now use the risk-neutral normal model with the same calibration strategy as above to
explore returns to disagreement generated by our model. We follow the same approach as above and
calibrate informational parameters to match the variation in forecast dispersion and informational
frictions reported for the GH sample, and asset returns to match skewness and volatility of firm-
level equity returns. As before we set γP to 0.75. We then vary D̃ to match the mean friction,
as well as the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile of the distribution of forecast dispersion
quintiles in GH.
The challenge is then to identify realistic targets for expected skewness and volatility of firm-
level equity returns: Unfortunately, DMS or GH do not report these moments when identifying
returns to disagreement. CDG report predicted skewness and volatility but their predicted skewness
measures are negative at the firm-level, which contradicts other available evidence and cannot be
consistent with a model generating negative returns to disagreement in equity markets.
We therefore calibrate our returns to match the realized firm-level skewness and volatility of
equity returns that are reported in Boyer et al. (2010), rather than their expected counterparts. In
the first row of Table 5, we report the monthly returns to a security that displays the mean level
of skewness and volatility reported in Table 1 (Panel A) of Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010), for
different levels of forecast dispersion, as well as the excess return of the 90th to 10th dispersion
percentile. Our model generates a negative excess return of 0.16% per month, corresponding to
roughly 60% of the returns reported in GH,28 with most of the return differential concentrated in
the top quintile, which is qualitatively consistent with the empirical findings.
27Similarly, Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2020) report that returns to disagreement are much lower and statistically
insignificant at the 5% level, when using value-weighted portfolios. This is consistent with the view that returns to
disagreement are largest in markets with low capitalization.




Ret Skew Vol Mean GH (0.301) 10% (0.048) 25% (0.092) 50% (0.16) 75% (0.251) 90% (0.342) 90%-10%
Mean 0.851 3.6 -0.09 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.16 -0.16
Q1 1.19 0.167 1.888 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Q2 1.12 0.375 2.087 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
Q3 1.10 0.565 2.672 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08
Q4 1.06 0.809 3.406 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.14 -0.14
Q5 0.52 1.629 5.342 -0.24 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.42 -0.42
Q5-Q1 -0.67 -0.23 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.41
Table 5: Returns to disagreement: model vs data
The subsequent rows report model-implied monthly returns for securities that match the dif-
ferent portfolios sorted on idiosyncratic skewness as in Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010), Table
3. These model implied returns to disagreement are decreasing with skewness, as predicted by
the theory, and concentrated in the top skewness and top dispersion quintiles. The variation in
returns to disagreement from the bottom to top skewness quintile (0.40%), as well as the variation
in returns to skewness from the bottom to the top disagreement quintiles (0.41%) are significant
and correspond to about 5% annual returns or about two thirds of the variation in returns to dis-
agreement and two thirds of the value premium reported in Yu (2011). In other words, our theory
accounts for a sizeable fraction of the level and variation in the observed returns to disagreement.29
To summarize, these three quantitative applications suggest that our theory can generate quan-
titatively significant levels and variation in returns to skewness, disagreement, and the interaction
between the two, for plausible levels of information frictions or forecast dispersion in equity and
29Compared to the CDG calibration, our calibration accounts for a much smaller fraction of the returns to skewness
in Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010), 0.23% in the model vs. 0.67% in the data, or 34% of the observed return
premium. This may be due to the fact that we cannot perfectly calibrate the model to match expected skewness as
we did in the CDG calibration. A second reason is that CDG report much higher levels of firm-level volatility - raising
the volatility targets in the present model to the levels reported in CDG would substantially increase, once again, the
ability of our model to account for observed returns to skewness and disagreement. In addition, firm-level volatility
turns out to be a strong predictor of idiosyncratic skewness, which may affect returns through a risk channel that
our model does not account for.We also calibrated our model using the moments for conditionally sorted portfolios in
Table 10 of Boyer, Mitton and Vorkink (2010). In this alternative calibration, controlling for idiosyncratic volatility,
the share of the returns to skewness explained by the model increases to 67%, primarily because the empirical return
premium is significantly lower.
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bond markets. Future work will have to refine these predictions, corroborate the empirical measures
used to calibrate information frictions, and evaluate the respective roles of information friction vs.
risk premia, but as a first pass these results illustrate that even relatively small levels of information
frictions may potentially account for significant cross-sectional return premia. Our quantitative re-
sults also replicate the empirical finding that most of these return premia are concentrated in the
highest dispersion quintile, in line with our observation that information frictions are small for most
firms, but can be very significant in the upper tail.
5 General Results
In this section, we generalize the equilibrium characterization and comparative statics results from
section 3. We show that the sufficient statistics representation of the equilibrium price with an
updating wedge, the construction of the risk-neutral measure, and the asset pricing implications
of excess weight on tail risks generalize immediately without further assumptions on preferences,
signal distributions and returns. The only step that is more involved is showing that the updating
wedge generates excess weight on tail risks in the risk-neutral measure. We show that excess weight
on tail risks arises whenever (i) the gap between the asset price and average investor expectations
is orthogonal to fundamentals, i.e. exclusively driven by supply shocks and (ii) investor expecta-
tions are approximately linear, i.e. linear projections provide a sufficiently close approximation of
Bayesian posteriors. These two sufficient conditions are satisfied by all canonical examples of noisy
REE studied in the literature. The core insights of our model thus extend far beyond the model
with risk-neutral investors and position limits.
We generalize the model set-up of section 2 by making the following assumptions:
(i) Generic prior distributions: the asset fundamental θ is distributed according to a generic
cdf. H (·), with variance V ar (θ) ≡ σ2θ . The specification of asset dividends π (·) is unchanged. The
stochastic asset supply s is distributed according to a generic cdf. G (·) with support [dL, dH ], with
dL ≤ 0 ≤ dH , and dL < dH .30
(ii) Generic signal distributions: Informed investors’ private signals are xi = θ+ εi, where εi is
i.i.d across agents, and distributed according to generic cdf. F (·) and smooth, symmetric density
function f (·) with unbounded support. We assume f ′ (·) /f (·) is strictly decreasing and unbounded
above and below, and let β ≡ 1/V ar (ε) denote the precision of private signals.31
30The model introduced in section 2 specified H (·) to be normal with mean 0 and variance σ2θ , and asset supply
had support [dL, dH ] = [0, 1] and G (·) s.t. s = Φ (u), where u was normally distributed.
31Monotonicity of f ′ (·) /f (·) implies signals have log-concave density and satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
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(iii) Generic investor preferences: Investors’ preferences are characterized by a strictly increas-
ing, concave utility function U (·) defined on the investors’ realized gains or losses di · (π(θ)− P ).
Their asset demand is restricted by position limits, i.e. di ∈ [dL, dH ].32 Given the investors’ pos-
terior H(·|x, P ), a demand function d(x, P ) is optimal, if it solves the investors’ decision problem
maxd∈[dL,dH ]
∫
U (d(π(θ)− P )) dH (θ|x, P ). This leads to the corresponding first-order condition∫
(π(θ)− P ) · U ′(d(π (θ)− P ))dH(θ|x, P ) = 0. (6)
As before, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium {d(x, P );P (θ, s);H(·|P )} consists of a demand func-
tion d(x, P ), a price function P (θ, s), and posterior beliefs H(·|P ) that jointly satisfy the investors’
optimality condition, the market-clearing condition and Bayes’ Rule whenever the latter is applica-
ble. We assume that there exists a price-monotone equilibrium {P (θ, s); d(x, P );H(·|P )} in which
d(x, P ) is strictly decreasing in P for d(x, P ) ∈ (dL, dH). Price monotonicity of demand arises
automatically if trade takes place through a limit-order book.33
5.1 Sufficient Statistic Representation
Fix any D̄ ∈ (dL, dH) and define z ≡ z (P ) as the private signal of an investor who finds it optimal
to hold exactly D̄ units at price P . z (P ) is implicitly defined by d(z, P ) = D̄. Since d(x, P ) is
strictly increasing in x, z (P ) is strictly increasing in P , and therefore serves as a sufficient statistic
for the information conveyed through the equilibrium price. By inverting z (P ), we can represent
the equilibrium price as a function of z only. Evaluating the investor’s first-order condition (6) at
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D̄ (π (θ)− Pπ (z))
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|x = z, z
) . (7)
In addition, we can construct posterior beliefs directly from the market-clearing condition.
Since aggregate demand D (θ, P ) =
∫
d (x, P ) dF (x − θ) is strictly decreasing in P , we have
Pr (P ≤ P ′|θ) = Pr (D (θ, P ) ≥ D (θ, P ′)) = Pr (s ≥ D (θ, P ′)) = 1 − G (D (θ, P ′)). Therefore
conditional on θ, z is distributed according to
Ψ (z|θ) = 1−G (D (θ, Pπ (z))) . (8)
property. Unboundedness implies extreme signal realizations induce large updates in posterior beliefs, (almost)
regardless of the information contained in other signals. In section 2 we assumed F (·) to be iid. normal, which
satisfies all these properties.
32In section 2 we assumed U (·) to be linear and positions to be bounded by [0, 1].
33To our knowledge, no general existence results are available for this class of models.
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Together with the prior H (·), this defines the joint distribution of P and θ, from which we derive
the posterior H(·|P ) using Bayes’ Rule whenever applicable. Hence, for given D̄, the equilibrium
is fully characterized by the fixed point between equations (7) and (8). These observations are
summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 : For any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium {P (θ, s); d(x, P );H(·|P )} with d(x, P ) strictly
decreasing in P at D̄ ∈ (dL, dH), there exists a sufficient statistic z = z (θ, s) such that P (θ, s) =
Pπ (z (θ, s)), where Pπ (·) satisfies (7) and the cdf of z satisfies (8).
Theorem 1 generalizes the sufficient statistic representation of Proposition 1 for any price-
monotone equilibrium. For each D̄ ∈ (dL, dH), there exists a state variable z, function of θ and
s only, such that we can represent the price as the risk-adjusted expectation of dividends of an
investor who finds it optimal to hold exactly D̄ units of the asset when the state is z.34
Equation (7) generalizes the result that the risk-neutral expectation of dividends differs from
the Bayesian posterior conditional on the same public information z. The risk-neutral expectation
of dividends processes the price signal twice, once as a public price signal, and once as the private
signal of the threshold investor who finds it optimal to purchase exactly D̄ units of the asset. The
intuition for this characterization is the same as the one given in section 3, i.e. shifts in fundamentals
or noise trader demand result in price adjustment, due to market-clearing, over and above the mere
information content of the price. In the expression for the equilibrium price, these two effects are
represented by the sufficient statistic z appearing twice in the conditioning set, once through the
price signal, and once through the marginal investor’s private information. This wedge between
the market expectation of dividends and the Bayesion posterior is thus a necessary characteristic
of any model with noisy information aggregation through asset prices.
Two ingredients are crucial for the appearance of this updating wedge. First the equilibrium
demand is not perfectly price-elastic, due to limits to the trader’s willingness (i.e. risk aversion) or
ability (i.e. position limits) to arbitrage any degree of perceived mispricing. Without such limits to
arbitrage, risk-neutral investors would be willing to take unlimited positions, prices would become
perfectly revealing and converge to the true dividend values (i.e. z would converge to θ, almost
surely), while supply shocks get seamlessly absorbed by the market.
34The representation in theorem 1 depends on the initial choice of D̄, but the representations for different values
of D̄ are all monotonic transformations of each other. They correspond to different decompositions of the price into
expected dividend and risk premium: the higher is D̄, the higher is the required risk premium, and hence also the
dividend expectation of the investor who holds D̄ in equilibrium. As D̄ → 0 the risk premium disappears.
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Second, information must be dispersed. To see this, we compare our characterization to an
otherwise identical economy in which all investors share the same information. Taking as given
supply s and an exogenous public signal z, the asset price with common information is
Vπ (z, s) =
E (U ′ (s (π (θ)− Vπ (z, s))) · π (θ) |z)
E (U ′ (s (π (θ)− Vπ (z, s))) |z)
. (9)
By comparing the common information price (9) to its dispersed information counterpart (7) with
D̄ set equal to s, we see exactly how dispersed information affects the response of prices to the
information aggregated through the market.
Theorem 1 only offers a partial equilibrium characterization: to fully characterize asset valua-
tions, we still need to compute, for some D̄, the distribution of the associated sufficient statistic
z. This distribution, however, derives from the market clearing condition D (θ, P ) = s, which
still requires information about the entire demand schedule. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 allows us to
develop implications for asset prices through a risk-neutral representation of the equilibrium price.
5.2 A risk-neutral probability measure for markets with dispersed information
Generalizing the construction of the risk-neutral measure is straight-forward: Let Ĥ(θ|z) = H(θ|x =
z, z) denote the risk-neutral posterior distribution over θ. Theorem 1 with D̄ = 0 gives us
a risk-neutral representation of the price as the conditional dividend expectation under Ĥ(θ|z),
Pπ (z) = Ê (π (θ) |z) =
∫
π (θ) dĤ(θ|z).35 The risk-neutral prior distribution Ĥ(θ) over θ is then
derived by compounding Ĥ(θ|z) with the prior over z: Ĥ(θ) =
∫
H(θ|x = z, z)dΨ (z), where
Ψ (z) =
∫
(1−G (D (θ, Pπ (z)))) dH (θ) denotes the prior cdf of z. This leads to the canonical rep-
resentation of asset prices as expected dividends under the risk-neutral measure Ĥ: E (Pπ (z)) =∫
Ê (π (θ) |z) dΨ (z) =
∫
π (θ) dĤ(θ) ≡ Ê (π (θ)) .
We say that Ĥ (·) displays excess weight on tail risks, if we can decompose the difference between
H (·) and Ĥ (·) into a shift in means and a mean-preserving spread, i.e. if the distribution with cdf




θdH (θ) represents a mean-preserving spread over H. We then
decompose E (Pπ (z))− E (π (θ)) as follows:
E (Pπ (z))− E (π (θ)) =
∫ ∞
−∞




H (θ)− Ĥ (θ + δ)
)
dπ (θ)
As before, the term R
(




−∞ (π (θ)− π (θ − δ)) dĤ (θ) accounts for the shift in
means. This term varies with the expected asset supply: for a given distribution of dividends, a
35With D̄ 6= 0, a similar representation applies, but in that case, we need to account for a risk adjustment in the
prior, which changes the interpretation of the comparative statics results.
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first-order stochastic increase in the supply distribution G (·) requires that informed investors buy
more shares in equilibrium, which lowers the marginal investor’s z. This downwards shift in the
price distribution is captured by a decrease in δ.








H (θ)− Ĥ (θ + δ)
)
dπ (θ), instead corresponds to
a second-order shift in the distribution. This term takes expectations of π (θ) w.r.t. two distribu-
tions with identical means but where Ĥ (θ + δ) is second-order stochastically dominated by H (θ),
capturing the excess weight on tail risks implied by the market expectations. Using second-order
stochastic dominance as a partial order on the severity of information aggregation frictions, we say
that Ĥ1 (·) has more excess weight on tail risk than Ĥ2 (·) iff Ĥ1 (·) is second-order stochastically
dominated by Ĥ2 (·). Theorem 2 generalizes the testable implications of excess weight on tail risks
for asset prices from Proposition 2.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the risk-neutral measure Ĥ1 has more excess weight on tail risk than Ĥ2.


























bitrarily large if Ĥ has arbitrarily large excess weight on tail risk.


















Generalizing predictions from Proposition 2 to Theorem 2 leads to two additional complications.
First, while the mapping from model parameters to observable forecast statistics was partic-
ularly transparent when expectations were linear, a direct empirical proxy for excess weight on
tail risks is more difficult to define for the general model, where this property is summarized not
by a single parameter but by a second-order stochastic dominance ranking. Nevertheless, if the
underlying information frictions are summarized by a small set of parameters, such as noise trader
variance and private signal precision, we can still calibrate these parameters to observed moments
of forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion.
Second, without additional assumptions of symmetry on the prior and risk-neutral measures,
the comparative statics w.r.t. return asymmetry require a more restrictive partial order in terms of
convexity and therefore apply only to returns that are continuous and unbounded on at least one
side. While this may not restrict the analysis of upside risks (such as options) too much, it seems
impractical to assume unboundedly negative dividend payoffs for downside risks.
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H (θ)− Ĥ (θ + δ)
)
dπ̂ (θ) , (10)
where π̂ (θ) = 1/2 · (π (θ) + π (−θ)). Hence, symmetry allows us to partially order upside and
downside risk in terms of the concavity and convexity of π̂ rather than π. If in addition to being
symmetric H (θ) and Ĥ (θ + δ) only cross at θ = 0 (i.e. H (θ) R Ĥ (θ + δ) for θ R 0), then upside
and downside risks can be ordered according to whether π̂ is increasing, constant or decreasing.
This allows us to generalize the partial order on returns to Definition 1 and recover the comparative
statics predictions of Proposition 2.
5.3 Sufficient conditions for excess weight on tail risk
The last remaining step in the argument is to show that the risk-neutral measure with dispersed
information indeed displays excess weight on tail risks. Our next proposition provides sufficient
conditions for excess weight on tail risks in the general model. We then show that these sufficient
conditions have a natural interpretation in terms of model properties and are satisfied in all leading
applications of noisy information aggregation models.
Proposition 3 : Suppose that Ê (θ|z) − E (θ|x, z) is independent of θ and θ − E (θ|x, z) is inde-
pendent of x. Then the risk-neutral probability measure Ĥ (·) displays excess weight on tail risks.
The first independence condition in proposition 3 requires that the gap between the average
informed trader’s expectation
∫
E (θ|x, z) dF (x− θ) and the marginal informed trader’s expectation
Ê (θ|z) is exclusively driven by random supply shocks. The second independence condition imposes
that residual uncertainty is independent of x. These two conditions correspond to the two properties
of the normal distribution that we used to link excess weight on tail risks to excess volatility of risk-
neutral market expectations, and to show that ˆV ar (θ) = V ar
(
θ + Ê (θ|z)− E (θ|x, z)
)
> V ar (θ).
To complete the proof of proposition 3, we show that these conditions not only imply that ˆV ar (θ) >
V ar (θ), but that the difference between the risk-neutral and objective priors decomposes into a
shift in means and a mean-preserving spread.
Next, we argue that these sufficient conditions are satisfied in important benchmark cases.
Differentiating the market-clearing condition D (θ, P ) = s with respect to θ, we obtain







We then say that equilibrium demand has a simple structure, if for all θ and z,




or equivalently, ∂z(θ,s)∂θ = 1. Therefore demand has a simple structure, if and only if the sufficient
statistic z (θ, s) takes a simple additive form “fundamentals plus noise”, z (θ, s) = θ+u (s) for some
monotone decreasing function u (·). As before, we denote the precision of z by τ ≡ 1/V ar (u (s)).
Simple demand structures encompass many existing models, such as the CARA normal model
and its non-normal extensions (e.g. Breon-Drish, 2015) in which demand is affine in the private
signal, or the risk-neutral model studied above. In general, ∂Pπ(z)∂z = −dx (z, P ) /dP (z, P ) mea-
sures the rate at which the marginal investor trades off between higher price and higher dividend
expectation, while (−Dθ/DP )−1 represents the same marginal rate of substitution for aggregate
demand, or investors on average. A simple demand structure imposes that the marginal and aver-
age investors’ marginal rates of substitution between higher price and higher dividend expectation
coincide. Departures from simple demand structures require that −dx (x, P ) /dP (x, P ) varies with
x, and that this variation does not wash out through aggregation.
Simple demand structures offer a useful benchmark for excess weight on tail risks. If demand
is simple and E (θ|x, z) is linear in x, then Ê (θ|z)− E (θ|x, z) is independent of θ, and V ar (θ|x, z)
is independent of x, which implies that ˆV ar (θ) = σ2P > V ar (θ), where σ
2
P is defined as in section
3.2.36 The characterization of excess weight on tail risks thus fully generalizes to any linear projec-
tion model. These models also satisfy the characterization of excess weight on tail risks in terms
of forecast dispersion and accuracy given by equation (5).
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a theory of asset price formation based on dispersed information and its ag-
gregation in asset markets. This theory ties expected asset returns to properties of their return
distribution and the market’s information structure. The theory imposes no restrictions on asset
payoffs, investor information and asset supply and therefore speaks to much wider and less stylized
asset classes than most of the prior literature on noisy information aggregation. Finally, our theory
is tractable and easily lends itself to applications as well as quantitative evaluation of asset pricing
puzzles by calibrating model parameters to moments of forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy.
36The stronger independence condition in Proposition 3 is required only to show that this excess variance property
implies a decomposition into a mean-preserving spread.
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In particular we show that our theory can account for a rich set of empirical facts regarding returns
to skewness and forecast dispersion in equity and bond markets.
Future work will have to explore the quantitative implications of dispersed information for
excess price volatility and return predictability, as well as other asset pricing puzzles. In Albagli,
Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2014) we use our framework to develop a dynamic model of corporate credit
spreads. A second direction is to explore the effects of public news and information disclosures. A
third direction consists in exploring how market frictions influence real decision-making by firms,
households or policy makers. Bassetto and Galli (2019) use a variant of our model to compare
information sensitivity of domestic and foreign debt and provide a theory of “original sin”. In Al-
bagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2017), we study the interplay between noisy information aggregation
and risk-taking incentives. In an earlier version of this paper, we applied our model to security
design and capital structure questions. These applications already suggest that our model may be
useful to shed light on other economic phenomena well beyond empirical asset pricing puzzles.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
The price function Pπ (z) = E (π (θ) |x = z, z) given by (1) is continuous and strictly increasing
in z. It then follows from arguments given in the text that when coupled with the threshold
x̂ (P ) = z and the associated posterior beliefs, Pπ (z) constitutes an equilibrium in which d (x, P ) is
non-increasing in P . Moreover, by market-clearing, z =x̂(Pπ (z)) and z
′ = x̂(Pπ (z
′)), and therefore
z = z′ if and only if Pπ (z) = Pπ (z
′). Therefore, the equilibrium conjectured above is the only
equilibrium, in which P is informationally equivalent to z.
It remains to be shown that there exists no other equilibrium in which demand is non-increasing
in P . In any equilibrium, in which d (x, P ) is non-increasing in P , x̂ (P ) must be non-decreasing
in P . Moreover, x̂ (P ) must be continuous – otherwise, if there were jumps, then there would be
certain realizations for z, for which there is no P , such that x̂ (P ) = z, implying that the market
cannot clear at these realizations of z. Now, if x̂ (P ) is strictly increasing in P , it is invertible, and
we are therefore back to the equilibrium that we have already characterized. Suppose therefore that
x̂(P ) x̂(P ) = x̂(P ′) = x̂(P ′′) for P ∈ (P ′, P ′′) and P ′′ > P ′. Suppose further that for sufficiently low
ε > 0, x̂(P ) is strictly increasing over (P ′ − ε, P ′) and (P ′′, P ′′ + ε), and hence uniquely invertible.37
But then for z ∈ (x̂(P ′ − ε), x̂(P ′) and z ∈ (x̂(P ′′), x̂ (P ′′ + ε)), P (z) is uniquely defined, so we have
37It cannot be flat everywhere, because then informed demand would be completely inelastic, and there would be
no way to absorb supply shocks.
41
P ′ ≥ limz↑x̂P (z) = limz↑x̂E (π (θ) |x = z, z) and P ′′ ≤ limz↓x̂P (z) = limz↓x̂E (π (θ) |x = z, z) . But
since E (π (θ) |x = z, z) is continuous, it must be that
P ′′ ≤ limz↓x̂E (π (θ) |x = z, z) = limz↑x̂E (π (θ) |x = z, z) ≤ P ′,
which yields a contradiction.
Derivation of equation 4:



























σ2θ = (1 + (γP /γV − 1) γP )σ2θ . Therefore,
































































Proof of Proposition 2:
Part (i) follows directly from applying Definition 1 in equation (4) and from taking the derivative
w.r.t. σP . Part (ii) follows from additivity (for given σP , W (π1, σP )−W (π2, σP ) = W (π1 − π2, σP ))
and applying part (i) to π1 − π2.

















2 (π (θ) + π (−θ)),
and therefore limσP→∞ |W (π, σP )| = limθ→∞ 12 |π (θ) + π (−θ)|.
Derivation of equation 5:
Simple algebra shows that
σ2P
σ2θ
= 1 + γP
γP − γV
γV
= 1 + γP
β/σ2θ(





1/σ2θ + β + τ




2 and γP (1− γP ) =
(β+τ)/σ2θ
(1/σ2θ+β+τ)
2 , it follows that
σ2P
σ2θ
= 1 + D̃2
γP (1− γP )
γP (1− γP )− D̃2
.
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= Φ (v) /Φ (ξ (v − v̄)), where v = θ/σθ, v̄ = θ̄/σθ, and ξ = σθ/σP .
Comparative statics of expected spreads and returns w.r.t. σ2P are immediate. Taking derivatives









− ξ φ (ξ (v − v̄))
Φ (ξ (v − v̄))
)
.

























which equals 0, whenever ξ < 1 (σP > σθ) or v̄ < 0.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We begin with two useful lemmas:
Lemma 1 Suppose that θ is distributed according to cdf. H (·) and that f (·) is log-concave and
f ′ (·) /f (·) unbounded. Then H (θ|x) ≡
∫ θ
−∞ f (x− θ
′) dH (θ′) /
∫∞
−∞ f (x− θ
′) dH (θ′) is decreasing






−∞ f (x− θ
′) dH (θ′)∫∞























f(x−θ) |x, θ′ > θ
)
Log-concavity and MLRP of f imply that whenever θ′ < θ, f (x− θ′) /f (x− θ) is decreasing in x
with limx→−∞f (x− θ′) /f (x− θ) = ∞ and limx→∞f (x− θ′) /f (x− θ) = 0. It follows that the
second ratio is strictly decreasing in x and converges to 0 as x→∞ and ∞ as x→ −∞.
Lemma 2 In any equilibrium, and for any P on the interior of the support of π(θ), there exist
xL (P ) and xH (P ), such that d (x, P ) = dL for all x ≤ xL (P ), d (x, P ) = dH for all x ≥ xH (P ),
and d (x, P ) is strictly increasing in x for x ∈ (xL (P ) , xH (P ))
Proof. For any D, consider the risk-adjusted cdf
H (·|P ;D) =
∫ θ
−∞ U
′ (D(π (θ)− P )) dH (θ|P )∫∞
−∞ U
′ (D(π (θ)− P )) dH (θ|P )
,
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and let H (·|x, P ;D) and E (π (θ) |x, P ;D)≡
∫
π (θ) dH (θ|x, P ;D) denote the cdf and conditional
expectations after updating conditional on a private signal x. By lemma 2, H (·|x, P ;D) is strictly
decreasing in x, E (π (θ) |x, P ;D) is strictly increasing in x and limx→−∞ E (π (θ) |x, P ;D) < P <
limx→∞ E (π (θ) |x, P ;D) for any P on the interior of the support of π (·). But then there exist
xL (P ) s.t. E (π (θ) |xL (P ) , P ; dL) = P , which implies that d (x, P ) = dL for all x ≤ xL (P ), and
xH (P )s.t. E (π (θ) |xH (P ) , P ; dH (P )) = P , which implies that d (x, P ) = dH for all x ≥ xH (P ).
For x ∈ (xL (P ) , xH (P )) and x′ > x, lemma 2 implies that P = E (π (θ) |x, P ; d (x;P )) <
E (π (θ) |x′, P ; d (x;P )), or equivalently E ((π(θ)− P )|x′, P ; d (x, P )) > 0. Since the LHS of this
condition is strictly decreasing in d, it follows that d (x′, P ) > d (x, P ).
Lemmas 1 and 2, and d (x, P ) strictly decreasing in P imply that there exists a unique z (P ) ∈
(xL (P ) , xH (P )); s.t. d (z (P ) , P ) = D̄, or equivalently, P = Pπ (z) = E
(
π (θ) |x = z (P ) , P ; D̄
)
.
Combining with the equilibrium price function, we then define a candidate sufficient statistic func-
tion z (θ, u) = z (P (θ, u)), and since z (P ) is invertible, z must be a sufficient statistic for the
information contained in P . Therefore we obtain the representation (7), along with representation
(8) of equilibrium beliefs.
Proof of Theorem 2:










π1 − π2, Ĥ
)
,
and applying part (i) to π1 − π2.
To complete the proof, we show that
∣∣∣W (π, Ĥ)∣∣∣ may become arbitrarily large if Ĥ (·) converges
to an improper distribution characterized by Ĥ (θ) → H̄ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that π is convex (the
proof for concave π is analogous), and note that we can write π (θ) = π̃ (θ) + ψθ, where ψ =
limθ→−∞π


















limK→∞π̃ (K) + H̄limK→∞π̃ (−K)− E (π (θ)) =∞,
since π̃ (θ) is bounded below but unbounded above for convex π.
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Derivation of Equation 10:













H (θ)− Ĥ (θ + δ)
)




































The second equality then follows from symmetry, π̂ (θ) = π̂ (−θ) andH (θ)−Ĥ (θ + δ) = Ĥ (−θ + δ)−
H (−θ).
Proof of Proposition 3:
We represent θ under the risk-neutral measure as E (θ|x = z, z) + v, where v = θ−E (θ|x = z, z).
If θ − E (θ|x, z) is independent of x, v has the same probability distribution as θ − E (θ|x, z), and
E (θ|x = z, z) + v has the same distribution as θ−E (θ|x, z) +E (θ|x = z, z). But if E (θ|x = z, z)−
E (θ|x, z) is independent of θ, then θ − E (θ|x, z) + E (θ|x = z, z) is a mean-preserving spread over
θ + δ,where δ = E (E (θ|x = z, z)) − E (θ). Hence the risk-neutral distribution decomposes into a
shift in means and a mean-preserving spread over the objective distribution of dividends.
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